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Abstract
The paper considers a bidirectional power flow model of the electric vehicles (EVs) in a charging
station. The EVs can inject energies by discharging via a Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) service which can
enhance the profits of the charging station. However, frequent charging and discharging degrade battery
life. A proper compensation needs to be paid to the users to participate in the V2G service. We propose
a menu-based pricing scheme, where the charging station selects a price for each arriving user for the
amount of battery utilization, the total energy, and the time (deadline) that the EV will stay. The user can
accept one of the contracts or rejects all depending on their utilities. The charging station can serve users
using a combination of the renewable energy and the conventional energy bought from the grid. We
show that though there exists a profit maximizing price which maximizes the social welfare, it provides
no surplus to the users if the charging station is aware of the utilities of the users. If the charging station
is not aware of the exact utilities, the social welfare maximizing price may not maximize the expected
profit. In fact, it can give a zero profit. We propose a pricing strategy which provides a guaranteed
fixed profit to the charging station and it also maximizes the expected profit for a wide range of utility
functions. Our analysis shows that when the harvested renewable energy is small the users have higher
incentives for the V2G service. We, numerically, show that the charging station’s profit and the user’s
surplus both increase as V2G service is efficiently utilized by the pricing mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Electric Vehicles (EVs) have several advantages over the traditional gasoline powered vehicles.
For example, EVs are more environment friendly and more energy efficient. Realizing the above,
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2regulators (e.g. Federal Energy Regulator Commission (FERC)) are providing incentives to the
consumers to switch to electric vehicles. Manufacturers (e.g. Tesla, Nissan) are increasingly de-
veloping EVs equipped with superior technologies. As a result, electric vehicles are increasingly
become popular. However, a wide deployment of EVs requires an extensive network of charging
stations which can be capable of charging large number of vehicles.
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service has been proposed [1], [2] to enhance the profitability of the
EVs. In the V2G service, EVs can inject energies to the grid by discharging from their batteries.
Thus, this bidirectional power flow where EVs can both charge and discharge has a lot of
potential. Hence, a lot of effort is going on for developing bidirectional EVs [3]. However, the
higher amount of charging and discharging cycles will degrade the battery life. Hence, the owners
of the EVs have to be compensated adequately for the V2G service. Thus, though a charging
station can gain an additional profit using the V2G service of the EVs, however without a proper
pricing mechanism, the owners of the EVs will not prefer the V2G service in the first place
which may nullify the profit of the charging station.
Without a proper control mechanism, the cost of the charging station and the peak energy
consumption may increase. Without a profitable charging station, the wide-scale deployment of
the EVs will remain a distant dream. The charging station needs to select prices in order to earn
profits by allocating resources in an intelligent manner among the EVs. The charging station also
needs to provide adequate compensation to the owners if the EV is used for the V2G service.
However, high prices or low compensation may not provide incentives to the owners which may
reduce the profit. Hence, a proper pricing mechanism for charging the EVs and the V2G service
is imperative for a charging station.
B. Our Contributions
We propose a menu based pricing scheme for charging an EV. Whenever an EV arrives at the
charging station, the charging station offers a variety of contracts (l, t, BU) to the EV’s owner
(or, user) at a price pBUl,t to the user where the user will be able to charge at least l units of
energy within the deadline t for completion, and the battery usage will be limited to l + BU
amount. The battery usage is the total amount of charging and discharging of the EV. The user
either accepts one of the contracts by paying the specified price or rejects all of those based on
its payoff. We assume that the user gets a utility for consuming l amount of energy within the
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3deadline t. However, the user also has to incur a cost for battery utilization BU . The payoff of
the user (or, user’s surplus) for a contract is the difference between the utility and the sum of
the cost incurred, and the price to be paid for the contract. The user will select the option which
fetches the highest payoff. The various advantages of the above pricing scheme should be noted.
First, it is an online pricing scheme. It can be adapted for each arriving user. Second, since
the charging station offers prices for different levels of charging required and the deadline, the
charging station can prioritize one contract over the others depending on the energy resources
available. Third, the charging station also provides options of the maximum battery utilization
to the users. The user who is not interested in the V2G service is entitled to do that by selecting
the contract with BU as 0. Finally, the user’s decision is much simplified. She only needs to
select one of the contracts (or, reject all).
We consider that the charging station is equipped with renewable energy harvesting devices
and a storage device for storing energies. The charging station may also buy conventional energy
from the market to fulfill the contract of the user if required. Hence, if a new user accepts the
contract (l, t, BU), a cost is incurred to the charging station. This cost may also depend on the
existing EVs and their resource requirements. A contract also specifies the maximum battery
utilization which restricts the V2G service generated from an EV. Hence, the charging station
needs to find the optimal cost for each contract. We show that obtaining the cost of fulfilling a
contract is a linear programming problem. We also show that if a user accepts a contract with
a higher battery utilization, the cost of the contract is lower (Lemma 1).
We consider two optimization problems–i) social welfare1 maximization, and ii) the EV
charging station’s profit maximization. We investigate the existence of a pricing mechanism
which maximizes the ex-post social welfare, i.e., maximizes the social welfare for every possible
realization of the utility function. We show that there exists such a pricing strategy. The pricing
scheme is simple to compute, as the charging station selects a price which is equal to the marginal
cost for fulfilling a certain contract for a new user (Theorem 3). However, the above pricing
scheme only provides zero profit to the charging stations. Thus, such a pricing scheme may not
be useful to the charging station. We show that when a charging station is clairvoyant (i.e., the
primary knows the utilities of the users), there exists a pricing scheme which satisfies both the
1Social welfare is the sum of the profit of the charging station and the user surplus.
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4objectives (Lemma 2). Though in the above pricing mechanism, the user’s surplus becomes 0.
Thus, a clairvoyant charging station may not be beneficial for the user’s surplus.
In the scenario where the charging station does not know the exact utilities of the users,
we show that there may not exist a pricing strategy which simultaneously maximizes the ex-
post social welfare and the expected profit. One has to give away the ex-post social welfare
maximization in order to achieve expected profit maximization. However, the user’s surplus
becomes higher compared to the clairvoyant scenario. Hence, an uncertainty of the utility
enhances the user’s surplus. We propose a pricing strategy which can fetch the highest possible
profit to the charging station under the condition that it maximizes the ex-post social welfare
(Theorem 4). Above pricing strategy provides a worst case maximum profit to the charging
station.
Since the above pricing strategy may not yield the maximum expected profit to the charging
station, we have to relax the constraint the social welfare to be maximized in order to yield a
higher profit to the charging station. Whether a contract will be selected by the user does not
depend on the price of the contract, but also, the prices of other contracts. Thus, achieving a
pricing scheme which maximizes the expected profit is difficult because of the discontinuous
nature of the profits. We propose a pricing strategy which yields a fixed (say β) amount of profit
to the charging station. Further, we show that a suitable choice of β can maximize the profit of
the charging station for a class of utility functions (Theorem 6).
In Section VI we characterize the conditions which will yield higher profits to the charging
station in the V2G service. We show that if the conventional energy price is high, the charging
station selects more preferable prices for enticing V2G services if the renewable energy harvested
is low. When the charging station’s storage capacity is low and the renewable energy harvesting
is low, the user’s incentives for the V2G service also increases. The V2G service also increases
the profit of the charging station.
Finally, we, empirically provide insights how a trade-off between the profit of the charging
station and the social welfare can be achieved for various pricing schemes (Section VII). Our
numerical analysis shows that both the user’s surplus and the charging station’s profit increase
with the V2G service. The energy consumption during the peak period decreases as users provide
more V2G services during the peak period.
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5C. Related Literature
Charging schedule for EVs using price signals for unidirectional service have been considered
[4]–[7]. The above papers did not consider the optimal discharging schedule of the EVs as these
papers only considered unidirectional power flow. As a result, these paper did not consider the
battery degradation cost incurred in the V2G service.
Few papers considered the bidirectional power flow [8]–[13]. However, their focus was schedul-
ing of the charging and discharging pattern of the EVs, rather than the pricing aspects. Naturally,
these papers did not consider whether users will prefer the amount of battery degradation found
in the optimal scheduling process. The social welfare maximizing and profit maximizing prices
are also not considered. [14] considered the optimal pricing to the EVs in a day-ahead setting
for residential charging. The users control the charging and discharging pattern at each instance
for the price selected by the aggregator in a pre-specified manner. However, the users can arrive
randomly in the charging station, the charging station needs to select a price for each arriving
user using an online algorithm. The users can not control the charging and discharging schedule
at each instance in the charging station. Compared to all the above papers, in our approach, the
charging station specifies the amount of battery utilization for each contract. The charging station
also selects prices for different deadlines in our approach. Hence, the user can now choose its
own deadline and can specify the V2G service it is willing to commit based on its own need.
Deadline differentiated prices have been considered [15]–[17]. In our previous work [18], we
also considered a menu-based pricing scheme where the charging station provides prices for
different deadlines and prices to the new user. However, the above papers did not consider the
bidirectional power flow problem. Thus, in this setting the charging station now also needs to
select different prices for different amounts of battery utilization. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to consider menu-based pricing which considered the bidirectional power
flow from the EVs. Further, this is the first work that incentivizes the users to participate in
the V2G service by finding optimal prices for different amounts of battery degradation while
maximizing the social welfare or profit of the charging station.
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Fig. 1. The trading model: Charging station offers a menu of
contracts for l, t, and BU ; the arriving user decides either one
of them or rejects all.
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Fig. 2. The hybrid energy source, the battery, and the charging
and discharging of EVs. rt,c, rt,d denote rt,charge, rt,discharge
respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Menu-based Pricing for arriving user
We consider that EVs arrive throughout a day at the charging station for charging. Suppose
that the user k arrives at time tk. The job of the charging station is to select a price for charging in
order to maximize the profit. We consider a vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service where electric vehicles
(EVs) can feed back stored power to the grid. Specifically, the energy can be discharged from
the batteries of the EVs. However, the EV batteries have fixed number of charging-discharging
cycles [19], [20]. When the battery is used for feeding back energy to the grid, the battery
wear cost may be significant. Thus, the users may want to limit the battery utilization as low as
possible.
We consider that a charging station wants to maximize its profit over a certain time period
(e.g. over a day). It will offer a menu-based price contract pBUk,l,t for contract (l, t, BU) to the
user k which arrives at time tk in the charging station (Fig. 1). If the user selects the menu
(l, t, BU), then, the user k will be able to charge l amount of energy at most within the deadline
t and the maximum amount of additional battery utilization (Definition 1) is restricted to BU .
The deadline t denotes that the user has to leave by time t, after which the EV will not be able
to charge.
B. System Constraints
First, we describe the constraints the charging station has to satisfy the contract (l, tdead, BU)
for the user k.
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7Charging/Discharging rate: Let rk,t be the amount of energy provided to (or, discharged
from) the EV k during time [t, t + 1). rk,t > 0 indicates that the EV k is charged and rk,t < 0
indicates that energy is discharged from the EV k during time [t, t+ 1). Also note that there is
an initial set K0 of existing EVs. Vehicle i ∈ K0 requires additional Ni amount of energy within
the deadline wi. The charging and discharging efficiency of the EV k is denoted as ηk,c ≤ 1 and
ηk,dc ≤ 1 respectively. Note that rk,t = r+k,t− r−k,t where r+k,t is the positive part of rk,t (it denotes
that the electric vehicle k is charged during time [t, t+ 1)) and r−k,t denotes the negative part of
rk,t ( it denotes the amount discharged from EV k during time [t, t+ 1)). Hence, the following
set of constraints must be satisfied–∑tdead−1
t=tk
rk,t ≥ l,
∑wi−tk−1
t=tk
ri,t ≥ Ni,∀i ∈ K0 (1)
rt,charge = r
+
k,t/ηk,c +
∑
i∈K0 r
+
i,t/ηi,c, (2)
rt,discharge = ηk,dcr
−
k,t +
∑
i∈K0 ηi,dcr
−
i,t (3)
rk,t = r
+
k,t − r−k,t, ri,t = r+i,t − r−i,t ∀i ∈ K0. (4)
rt,charge indicates the total amount of energy required for charging and rt,discharge indicates the
total amount of energy used when EVs discharge during time [t, t + 1). Note that an EV can
not simultaneously charge and discharge, hence, we must have r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 for all i ∈ K0 ∪ {k}
and t. Later we will show in Theorem 1 that in an optimal solution r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 though we have
not explicitly considered the above constraint in the system.
EV’s battery limit: Let the battery level of the EV i at time t be EVi,t. Let the battery level
at the start of the time tk be EVi,ini. Since the battery of the EV can be charged or discharged
in the V2G service, the total amount of charging and discharging must satisfy the limits on the
battery levels:The battery level must be between a lower value di,min (it can be 02 ) and the high
value di,max (the highest capacity). Hence, we must have
EVi,t+1 = EVi,t + r+i,t − r−i,t,
EVi,tk = EV
i,ini ∀i ∈ K0 ∪ {k},
di,min ≤ EVi ≤ di,max ∀i ∈ K0 ∪ {k}. (5)
2However, low depth of discharge can degrade the battery life [20]. Hence, the minimum value can be set at some positive
value.
DRAFT
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Charging and Discharging rate limit: There is also a charging and discharging limit. Hence,
we have
Rmin ≤ rk,t ≤ Rmax, Rmin ≤ ri,t ≤ Rmax∀i ∈ K0. (6)
Rmax, and Rmin are respectively the charging and discharging rate limits.
Hybrid Source: The charging station is equipped with renewable energy harvesting devices
(Fig. 2). The charging station also has a storage device with capacity Bmax. The charging station
has the forecast of harvested energy as E¯t for time [t, t+ 1). The charging station also can buy
energies from the conventional market. Suppose that the amount of energy used from the storage
device during time [t, t + 1) be et and let the energy be stored from the electric vehicles and
the conventional energy in the storage device be st during time [t, t+ 1) (Fig. 2). Let Bt be the
level of battery at time t. The charging efficiency and discharge efficiency of the battery of the
charging station is considered to be ηc,cs and ηd,cs respectively. Thus,
Bt+1 = Bt + E¯tηc,cs − et/ηd,cs + stηc,cs, (7)
Bmax ≥ Bt+1 ≥ 0, Btk−1 = B0, BT = B0. (8)
Note that our model can also incorporate the scenario where the batteries have some static
leakage rate i.e. the battery level decreases with time.
Energy to and from the grid: Let the amount the charging station buys from the conventional
market and sells to the grid as qt and xt respectively for time [t, t+ 1) (Fig: 2). Hence, we have
et = max{rt,charge − qt + xt − rt,discharge, 0}
st = max{qt − rt,charge + rt,discharge − xt, 0}.
Since st is the negative of et, thus, we can represent the above constraint in the following–
qt − rt,charge + rt,discharge − xt = st − et, st ≥ 0, et ≥ 0. (9)
We also must have etst = 0 since the battery of the charging station should not charge or
discharge at the same time. Though we have not explicitly considered the above constraint,
however, we show that in an optimal solution in Theorem 1, we always have etst = 0.
Note that the constraints in (8) and (9) also specify the bound on the amount of charging and
discharging from the EVs. The amount of charging can not exceed the total amount of stored
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9energy in the battery and the energy bought from the grid. The stored energy depends on the
harvested renewable energy, energy charged to the EVs and discharged from the EVs, energy
bought and energy sold to the grid.
Fig. 2 depicts various system parameters.
Maximum Battery Utilization In the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) service, frequent charging and
discharging may reduce the lifecycle of the battery of an EV. Thus, the users may not like
the EVs be charged and discharged very often. We define a metric which will model the total
maximum utilization of the battery of an EV.
Definition 1. Battery utilization is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the
battery levels at two subsequent time intervals.
Hence, if the deadline is tdead for user k, then the total battery utilization for user k is∑tdead−1
t=tk
|EVk,t+1 − EVk,t|.
The battery utilization defines the total level of charging and discharging has been done. If the
EV k is used only for charging, then
∑tdead−1
t=tk
|EVk,t+1− EVk,t| = l. In a contract (l, tdead, BU),
the battery of EV needs a charging amount of l, and thus, the total battery utilization has to be
at least l.
Thus, the contract (l, tdead, BU) where BU = 0, 1, . . . , BUmax denotes the additional battery
utilization apart from the charging amount l specified by the contract. We denote BU as the
maximum additional battery utilization with slight abuse of notation. Specifically, in the contract
(l, tdead, BU), the maximum utilization is restricted to l +BU for user k.
Note that l is the energy that the user k will receive in the contract (l, tdead, BU). Suppose
the maximum utilization remaining for an existing user i ∈ K0 at time tk is BUi. Thus, if the
user k selects the contract (l, tdead, BU), the constraint that the charging station has to satisfy is
tdead−1∑
t=tk
|EVk,t+1 − EVk,t| − l ≤ BU,
wi−tk−1∑
t=tk
|ri,t − ri,t−1| −Ni ≤ BUi∀i ∈ K0. (10)
The above constraint is not linear. In the following we reduce it in a linear form.
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Note from (5) that
EVi,t+1 = EVi,t + r+i,t − r−i,t = ri,t + EVi,t.
|EVi,t+1 − EVi,t| = |ri,t|. (11)
Since r+i,t and r
−
i,t are the positive and negative parts of ri,t, thus, |ri,t| = r+i,t + r−i,t. Hence, the
expression in (10) becomes
tdead−1∑
t=tk
r+k,t + r
−
k,t − l ≤ BU,
wi−tk−1∑
t=tk
r+i,t + r
−
i,t −Ni ≤ BUi∀i ∈ K0. (12)
Note that we must have r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0. We show in Theorem 1 that this is indeed true in an optimal
solution.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. User’s utilities
User’s utility for the contract (l, t, BU) is denoted as UBUk,l,t which is a random variable. The
realized value uBUk,l,t is only known to the user k, but not known to the charging station in general.
The payoff of user k or user’s surplus if she selects the contract (l, t, BU) is uBUk,l,t−pBUk,l,t (Fig. 1).
If she rejects all her payoff is 0. The user will select the contract that fetches the maximum
payoff to her.
Thus, for a menu of prices pBUk,l,t, the user k selects A
BU
k,l,t ∈ [0, 1] such that it maximizes the
following
maximize
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
BUmax∑
BU=0
ABUk,l,t(uk,l,t,BU − pBUk,l,t)
subject to
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
BUmax∑
BU=0
Ak,l,t,BU ≤ 1 (13)
Note that ABUk,l,t > 0 only if maxi,j,b{uk,i,j,b − pk,i,j,b} = uBUk,l,t − pBUk,l,t. If such a solution is not
unique, any convex combination of these solutions is also optimal since a user can select any
of the maximum payoff contracts.
We denote the decision as ABUk,l,t(pk). Note that the decision whether to accept the menu price
pBUk,l,t depends not only on the price p
BU
k,l,t but also other price menus i.e. p
b
k,i,j where i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
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and j ∈ {tk + 1, . . . , T} and b ∈ {0, . . . , BUmax}. This is because the user only selects the price
menu which is the most favorable. Note that if the maximum payoff that user gets among all
the price menus (or, contracts) is negative, then the user will not charge i.e., Abk,l,t = 0 for all
l, t and b. We also assume that if there is a tie between charging and not charging, then the
user will decide to charge i.e., if the maximum payoff that user can get is 0, then the user will
decide to charge 3.
B. Myopic Charging Station
Since the users arrive to the charging station at any time throughout the day, the charging
station does not know the exact arrival times for the future vehicles. We consider that the charging
station is myopic or near-sighted i.e., it selects its price for user k without considering the future
arrival process of the vehicles. However, it will consider the cost incurred to charge the existing
EVs. Note that as the number of existing users increases, the marginal cost can increase to fulfill
a contract for an arriving user, hence, such a pricing strategy may not maximize the payoff in
a long run. Note that, a myopic pricing strategy is optimal in the case the marginal cost of
fulfilling a demand of a new user is independent of the number of existing users.
In practice, the charging station often has fixed number of charging spots. Thus, the charging
station may want to select high prices for user k, in order to make the charging spots available
for the users who can pay more but only will arrive in future4. Hence, considering the future
arrival process of the vehicles may increase the profit of the charging station. However, such a
pricing strategy is against the first come first serve basis which is the current norm for charging
vehicles. Our approach can be seen as a fair allocation process, where the charging station serves
users based on the first come first serve basis.
3However, our result can be readily extended to the other options, in that case the price strategies given in this paper have to
decreased by an  > 0 amount.
4The above consideration is left for the future work.
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C. Optimal Cost of the charging station to fulfill a menu
The optimal cost for the charging station to fulfill the contract (l, tdead, BU) to the user k is
thus
PBUl,tdead :minimize
T−1∑
t=tk
(ctqt − gtxt)
subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (12).
var qt ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0, et ≥ 0, st ≥ 0,
r+i,t ≥ 0, r−i,t, ri,t ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ K0 ∪ {k}. (14)
where ct is the per unit cost of buying energy from the grid and gt is the per unit cost of
selling energy to the grid. Note that our model can also incorporate time varying, strictly
increasing convex costs Ct(·) or concave prices Gt(·).We assume that ct ≥ gt in order to avoid
arbitrage opportunity. However, the above cost structures will destroy the properties of the linear
programming.
Our model can be easily extended to the setting where there are upper bounds on qt and xt.
The problem will still be a linear programming problem.
The cost ct and the price gt are assumed to be known. In case they change in a dynamic
manner i.e., they are real time prices, we consider that ct is the expected cost, and gt is the
expected price.
Note that the above problem is a linear programing problem (similar to the setting considered
in [18]) and thus, it is easy to solve. However, the number of constraints are hugher compared
to [18] as we consider the V2G service.
In the following theorem, we show that the optimal cost to the charging station given in (12),
r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 and etst = 0 for all t, and i ∈ K0 ∪ {k}.
Theorem 1. In an optimal solution of the problem PBUl,tdead , we must have the decision variables
r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 ∀i ∈ K0∪{k} and t. Further, in an optimal solution, we also have etst = 0 for all t.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The above theorem shows that in an optimal solution, neither the EV nor the battery of the
charging station simultaneously charge and discharge.
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Now we calculate the additional cost imposed to the charging station for fulfilling the new
contract. First, we introduce some notations which we use throughout.
Definition 2. The charging station has to incur the cost vBUl,tdead for serving the existing users and
the contract (l, tdead, BU) for the new user k where vBUl,tdead is the value of the linear optimization
problem PBUl,tdead .
Since PBUl,tdead is a linear optimization problem, it is easy to compute vBUl,t . Further, note that if
the above problem is infeasible for some l, t and BU , then we consider vBUl,t as ∞.
Definition 3. Let v−k be the amount that the charging station has to incur to satisfy the
requirements of the existing EVs if the new user does not opt for any of the price menus.
If user k does not accept any price menu, then the charging station still needs to satisfy the
demand of existing users i.e., the charging station must solve the problem PBUl,tdead with rk,t = 0. v−k
is the value of that optimization problem. From Definitions 2 and 3 we can visualize vBUl,tdead−v−k
as the additional cost or marginal cost to the charging station when the user k accepts the price
menu pBUk,l,tdead .
We assume that the prediction E¯t is perfect for all future times and is known to the charging
station. However, menu-based pricing approach can be extended to the setting where the estimated
generation does not match the exact amount. First, we can consider a conservative approach where
E¯t can be treated as the worst possible renewable energy generation. As a second approach, we
can accumulate various possible scenarios of the renewable energy generations, and try to find
the cost to fulfill a contract for each such scenario. For example, if there are M number of
possible instances of the renewable energy generation amount in future. Then, we can find the
optimal cost for each such instance of renewable energy generation E¯m,t where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
instead of E¯t. We then can compute the average (or, the weighted average, if some instance has
greater probability) of the optimal costs, and that cost can be taken as the cost of fulfilling a
certain contract.
The following result entails that the V2G service indeed reduces the cost of the charging
station.
Lemma 1. vBU1l,t ≤ vBU2l,t for any BU1 > BU2. Thus, vBUl,t ≤ v0l,t for any BU ≥ 1.
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Outline of the Proof: Note from (12) that the decision space is more restricted for BU2
compared to BU1 if BU1 > BU2. Every feasible solution with BU2 is also feasible with BU1
since BU1 > BU2. Thus, the above result follows.
Since the charging station can sell some energies taken from the EVs, the cost of fulfilling
the contract (l, t, BU) will be lower as BU will increase.
D. Charging Station’s Profit
If the user k selects the menu (l, t, BU), then the additional cost incurred by the charging
station is vBUl,t − v−k. Hence, the profit of the charging station is pBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k. If the user
does not select any of the menus, then the charging station gets 0 profit. Thus, the expected
profit of the charging station is
BUmax∑
BU=0
L∑
l=1
t=tk+T∑
t=tk+1
(pBUk,l,t − vl,t,BU) Pr(RBUk,l,t) (15)
where Pr(RBUk,l,t) is the probability of the event that the menu (l, t, BU) is accepted by the user
k. Note from (15) that the profit maximization is a difficult problem as the menu selected by
an user inherently depends on the prices selected for other menus. For example, if the price
selected for a particular contract is high, the user will be reluctant to take that as compared to a
lower price one. The profit is a discontinuous function of the prices and thus, the problem may
not be convex even when the marginal distribution of the utilities are concave.
E. Objectives
We consider that the charging station decides the price menus in order to fulfill one of the
two objectives (or, both)– i) Social Welfare Maximization and ii) its profit maximization.
1) Social Welfare: The social welfare is the sum of user surplus and the profit of the charging
station. As discussed in Section III-A for a certain realized values uBUk,l,t if the user k selects the
price menu pBUk,l,t, then its surplus is u
BU
k,l,t − pBUk,l,t, otherwise it is 0.
As discussed in Section III-D the profit of the charging station is pBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + vk for a
given price pBUk,l,t if the user selects the menu, and it is 0 otherwise. Hence, the social welfare
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maximization problem is to select the price menu pk,l,t which will maximize the following
Pperfect :max
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
BUmax∑
BU=0
(uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k)Ak,l,t(pk)
var : pBUk,l,t ≥ 0. (16)
Recall that in order to find vBUl,t we have to solve Pl,t(cf. (14)) which is a constrained optimization
problem.
Since the charging station is unaware of the utilities of the users, the charging station has two
choices-i) decides a price and hopes that it will maximize the social welfare for the realized
values of utilities (ex-post maximization) , or ii) decides a price and hopes that it will maximize
the social welfare in an expected sense (ex-ante maximization). Thus, the ex-ante maximization
does not guarantee that the social welfare will be maximized for every realization of the random
variables Uk,l,t. However, in the ex-post maximization, the social welfare is maximized for each
possible realization of the random variables. Thus, ex-post maximization is a stronger concept
of maximization (and thus, also more desirable) and it is not necessary that there exist pricing
strategies which maximize the ex-post social welfare. However, we show that in our setting
there exist pricing strategies which maximize the ex-post social welfare. Note that ex-post social
welfare maximization is the same as (16).
2) Profit Maximization: Social welfare maximization does not guarantee that the charging
station may get a positive profit. It is important for the wide scale deployment of the charging
stations that the charging station must have some profit. The charging station needs to select
pBUk,l,t in order to maximize the expected profit (given in (15)).
Note that in order to select optimal pBUk,l,t, the charging station has to obtain v
BU
l,t i.e., it has to
solve the problem PBUl,t (cf. (14)) for each choice of l, t and BU .
3) Separation Problem: Note that in order to select optimal pBUk,l,t, the charging station has to
obtain vBUl,t and v−k (Definitions 2 & 3). However, vl,t and v−k do not depend on p
BU
k,l,t. Hence,
we can separate the problem–first the charging station finds vBUl,t and vk, and then it will select
pBUk,l,t to fulfill the objective. We now focus on finding optimal p
BU
k,l,t.
IV. RESULT: EX-POST SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
First, we state the optimal values of the social welfare for any given realization of the user’s
utilites. Next, we state a pricing strategy which attains the above optimal value.
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Note that if uBUk,l,t− vBUl,t + v−k < 0 for each l,t, and BU , then the social welfare is maximized
when the user k does not charge. In this case, the optimal value of social welfare is 0.
On the other hand if uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t ≥ −v−k for some l, t, and BU then the social welfare is
maximized when the user k charges its car. If the user accepts the price menu pBUk,l,t, then the
social welfare is uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k. Thus, the maximum social welfare in the above scenario is
maxl,t,BU(u
BU
k,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k) as described in the following theorem–
Theorem 2. The maximum value of social welfare is max{maxl,t,BU(uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k), 0}.
We obtain
Theorem 3. If pBUk,l,t = vBUl,t − vk , then it will maximize the ex-post social welfare.
Outline of the Proof: If the price is set according to the above, the user will not select any
contract if maxl,t,BU(uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k) < 0 which gives 0 social welfare. The user select the
contract which maximizes the payoff if maxl,t,BU(uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k) ≥ 0. In this case, the
ex-post social welfare is maxl,t,BU(uBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k). Hence, the result follows.
However, the above pricing mechanism does not give any non-zero profit to the charging
station. The above pricing strategy is distribution independent, it holds for any arbitrary distri-
bution.
Also note that the pricing strategy also maximizes the social welfare in the long run when
the additional cost of fulfilling a contract (i.e. vBUl,t − v−k) does not depend on the existing users
in the charging station. The condition that vl,t − v−k is independent of the existing EVs in the
charging station is satisfied if either all demand can be fulfilled using renewable energy or there
is no renewable energy generation. Hence, in the two above extreme cases, the myopic pricing
strategy is also optimal in the long run.
V. RESULT:PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
A. Maximum Profit under ex-post social welfare maximization
We have already seen a pricing strategy which maximizes the ex-post social welfare in
Theorem 3, however, this pricing strategy does not give any positive profit. Naturally the question
arises what is the pricing strategy that maximizes the expected profit of the charging station which
will also maximize the ex-post social welfare.
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We show that there exists a pricing strategy which may provide better profit to the charging
station while maximizing the ex-post social welfare. First, we introduce a notation which we
use throughout.
Definition 4. Let LBUk,l,t be the lowest end-point of the marginal distribution of the utility UBUk,l,t.
Theorem 4. Consider the pricing strategy:
pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + (max
i,j,b
{Lbk,i,j − vbi,j + v−k})+. (17)
The pricing strategy maximizes the ex-post social welfare.
The profit is (maxi,j,b{Lbk,i,j − vbi,j + v−k})+.
Outline of proof: First, note that adding a constant does not change the optimal solution. Hence,
if (l∗, t∗, b∗) = argmaxl,t,b(u
b
k,l,t − vbl,t + v−k), then (l,∗ , t∗) is also optimal for price strategy in
(17). Now, if the price is set according to (17), when ub∗l∗,t∗ ≥ vb∗l∗,t∗ − v−k, the user always select
the contract. If the condition is not satisfied, the user does not select the contract. Hence, the
ex-post social welfare is always maximized.
Note that if maxl,t,BU(LBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k) > 0, then such a pricing strategy will provide a
positive profit to the charging station. Hence, if vBUl,t − v−k is smaller than the lowest end-point
of the distribution function, then the profit will be positive.
Also note that the users which have higher utilities i.e., higher LBUk,l,t will give more profits to
the charging station.
The charging station needs to know the lowest end-points of the support set of the utilities
unlike in Theorem 3. However, the charging station does not need to know the exact distribution
functions of the utilities similar to Theorem 3. The lowest end-point can be easily obtained from
the historical data.
The pricing strategy maximizes the ex-post social welfare similar to Theorem 3. This is also the
maximum possible profit that the charging station can have under the condition that it maximizes
the ex-post social welfare with probability 1. However, it may not maximize the expected profit
of the charging station. In other words, the pricing strategy which maximizes the expected profit
needs not maximize the ex-post social welfare.
When the charging station is clairvoyant: We have seen that if the charging station is
unaware of the realized values of the utilities, there is no pricing strategy which maximizes both
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the expected profit and the ex-post social welfare. However, we show that if the charging station
is clairvoyant i.e., it is aware of the realized values of the utilities of the users, then there exists
a pricing strategy which both maximizes the social welfare and the profit of the charging station.
First, we introduce a notation.
Definition 5. Let (l∗, t∗, b∗) = arg maxl,t,b{ubk,l,t − vl,t}.
Lemma 2. Let pBUk,l,t = vBUl,t −v−k+(ub∗k,l∗,t∗−vb∗l∗,t∗+v−k)+ where (l∗, t∗, b∗) is given in Definition 5.
Such a pricing strategy maximizes the profit as well as the social welfare.
There can be other pricing strategies which simultaneously maximize the social welfare and
the profit. Though the joint profit and social welfare maximizing pricing strategy may not be
unique, the profit of the charging station is the unique and is given by
max{ub∗k,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ + v−k, 0} (18)
The above pricing strategy is an example of value-based pricing strategy where prices are set
depending on the valuation or the utility of the users [21]. In contrast, the price strategy stated
in Theorem 3 is an example of cost-based pricing strategy where the prices only depend on the
costs. In the value-based pricing strategy, the user surplus decreases, in fact it is5 0 in our case.
Thus all the user surplus is transferred as the profit of the charging station. Thus, uncertainty
regarding the utilities enhance the user’s surplus.
B. Guaranteed positive profit to the Charging station
Theorem 4 entails that the charging station only has a positive profit if maxl,t,b{Lbk,l,t− vbl,t +
vk} > 0. If the above condition is not satisfied, the charging station’s profit will be 0. In the
following we consider a pricing strategy which will give a guaranteed positive profit to the
charging station.
Consider the pricing strategy
pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + β (19)
5If the user is reluctant to charge if it does not get a positive payoff, then, we can reduce the price by  > 0 amount. In that
case, it will be (1− ) optimal profit maximizing strategy.
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where β > 0.
Note that the pricing strategy stated in (17) is a variant of the pricing strategy stated in (19)
where β = (maxi,j,b{Lbk,i,j − vbi,j + v−k})+ if we allow β can also be 0.
The pricing strategy stated in (19) gives the same positive profit irrespective of the menu
selected by the user. The regulator such as FERC can select a β judiciously to trade off between
the profit of the charging station and the social welfare. From Lemma 1, the pricing strategy
stated in (19) selects lower price for higher battery utilization. This is desirable, as the user
needs to be given incentive to battery utilization.
Higher β will deter the user’s surplus. Also note that when β > 0, it may not maximize the
ex-post social welfare from Theorem 4. Very high value of β also decreases the profit of the
charging station, as users will be reluctant to accept any of the menus.
The expected profit of the charging station for the above pricing strategy is–
Theorem 5. The expected profit of the charging station when it selects price according to (19)
is βmaxl,t,BU{Pr(UBUk,l,t ≥ vBUl,t − v−k + β)}.
Outline of the Proof: Note that if a user selects any of the contracts, then the charging station’s
profit is β. Hence, the charging station’s expected profit is β times the probability that at least
one of the contracts will be accepted.
Now, we provide an example where the pricing strategy in (19) can also maximize the expected
profit for a suitable choice of β. First, we introduce a notation
Definition 6. Let ζ = max{γ|γ ∈ argmaxβ≥0β{maxi,j,b Pr(U bk,i,j ≥ β + vbi,j − v−k}}.
Note that since UBUk,l,t is bounded and the probability distribution is continuous, thus, ζ exists.
Note from Theorem 5 that ζ corresponds to β the charging station can get the maximum possible
expected profit when the prices are of the form (19). If the utilities are drawn from a strictly
increasing continuous distribution, then the set of γ would be singleton and we do not need to
specify the maximum.
Now, consider the pricing strategy
pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + ζ. (20)
where ζ is as given in Definition 6. The above pricing strategy maximizes the profit for a class
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of utility functions which we describe below.
Assumption 1. Suppose that the utility function UBUk,l,t = (Y BUk,l,t + Xk) for all l, t & BU ; Y BUk,l,t
is a constant and known to the charging station, and Xk is a random variable whose realized
value is not known to the charging station.
In the above class of utility function, the uncertainty is only regarding the realized value of
the random variable Xk. Note that Xk is independent of l, BU and t, hence,Xk is considered
to be an additive noise.
It is important to note that we do not put any assumption whether Xk should be drawn from a
continuous or discrete distribution. However, if the distribution is discrete, we need the condition
that ζ must exist.
Theorem 6. The pricing strategy stated in (20) maximizes the expected profit of the charging
station (given in (15)) when the utility functions are of the form given in Assumption 1.
The above result is surprising. It shows that a simple pricing mechanism such as the fixed
profit can maximize the expected payoff for a large class of utility functions. However, if the
utilities do not satisfy Assumption 1 the above pricing strategy may not be optimal.
VI. THE USER’S PARTICIPATION IN THE V2G SERVICE AND THE PROFITABILITY
The V2G service will proliferate only if the users participate in that service. The charging
station can attain extra profits through the V2G service. However, the users will only select
the menu with positive battery utilization if they get enough compensation. Thus, the charging
station’s profit inherently depends on whether the users have incentives to participate in the V2G
services. In this section, we will analyze the conditions under which the users will be willing to
participate in the V2G service, and the profit of the charging station will increase.
A. Cost of Battery Utilization
First, we discuss the cost of battery utilization. Users will strictly prefer lower utilization as
lower BU will increase the battery life. A higher battery utilization may increase the battery
degradation cost [19], [20]. We denote the cost associated with the utilization BU for user k is
Ck(BU) where Ck(·) is a strictly increasing function.
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The cost Ck(·) depends on the the state of the battery6 [19], [20]. We assume that the user’s
utility UBUk,l,t is
UBUk,l,t = Uk,l,t − Ck(BU) (21)
We consider that the cost function Ck(BU) for the battery utilization as a linear function i.e.
Ck(BU) = αkBU . Recently, [20] shows that the per unit degradation cost for discharging
remains almost constant for a wide range of values. Hence, a linear cost model can be a good
approximation of the cost function. However, our analysis can be easily extended to other cost
models. The charging station and even the user may not know the exact value of αk. But, the EV
manufacturer can easily provide the pessimistic approximation of αk such as the worst possible
battery degradation cost for per unit of energy.7
The realized value of the utility function of user k is now uk,l,t − αkBU .
B. Profitability of the V2G service
Note that if BU ≥ 1 provides a positive payoff and a higher payoff to the user compared to
BU = 0, then the user will opt for V2G service. The following result formalizes the condition.
Theorem 7. User k opts for battery degradation BU ≥ 1, if uBUk,l,t−pBUk,l,t ≥ max{0, u0k,l,t−p0k,l,t}
for some BU ≥ 1.
Now, we consider the pricing strategy stated in (19) i.e., pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + β. Note that
with a linear battery degradation cost discussed in the last section uBUk,l,t = u
0
k,l,t − αkBU. Our
next result characterizes the condition for user’s participation in the V2G service for a linear
battery degradation cost. From Theorem 7
Theorem 8. If the following is satisfied: vBUl,t < v0l,t−αkBU for some BU ≥ 1,l,and t; then the
user k will have any incentive for V2G service when the pricing strategy is as given in (19).
The expected profit of the charging station also increases under the above condition.
6The cost may also depend on the total number of charging and discharging cycles the car has gone through. It may also
depend on the user’s willingness to participate in the V2G service.
7Recently, [20] shows that the battery degradation cost of Li-Ion battery for per unit of energy is shown to be between 4
cents and 7 cents. In this example αk can be taken as 7 cents per kwh.
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Outline of the Proof: Note that uBUk,l,t− pBUk,l,t = u0k,l,t−αkBU − vBUl,t + v−k − β. Thus, the user
will never select the contract with BU = 0 if vBUl,t < v
0
l,t − αkBU for some BU ≥ 1.
In the fixed profit scheme, the charging station always gets a profit of β for if a contract is
selected. When vBUl,t < v
0
l,t − αkBU for some BU ≥ 1, the user’s probability of selecting any
contract increases. Hence, the expected profit of the charging station increases from Theorem
5.
Thus, if vBUl,t < v
0
l,t−αkBU for some BU ≥ 1, the user’s surplus and the profit of the charging
station both increase.
If the harvested renewable energy is large enough, then the charging station can fulfill the
demand using the renewable energy. Hence, the difference between vBUl,t and v
0
l,t will be not
enough for the user to participate in the V2G service. On the other hand, if the harvested
renewable energy is small, then the charging station may have to buy expensive conventional
energy from the grid to fulfill the demand. Hence, the user will have a higher incentive to
participate in the V2G service as the difference between vBUl,t and v
0
l,t may be significant. The
difference is more significant when the conventional energy is more expensive (e.g. peak period).
Thus, the user will have a higher incentive to participate in the V2G service when the renewable
energy generation is small and the cost of the conventional energy is high.
If the storage capacity of the charging station is large, the charging station may buy energy
from the grid during the off-peak period and use it during the peak period. This also reduces
the difference between v0l,t and v
BU
l,t . However, if the storage capacity is low, the difference
between v0l,t and v
BU
l,t again increases. Hence, the user’s participation towards the V2G service
is more likely when the storage capacity of the charging station is small and the renewable
energy harvesting is low. This shows the necessity of the V2G service for better profitability as
the high storage capacity is very costly to procure and the penetration of the renewable energy
is still low.
C. EVs only for discharge
So far, we assumed that EVs only come for charging where l > 0 for menu-pricing. However,
once the V2G service proliferates, the users with their fully charged batteries may come during
the peak hours to the charging station in order to only discharge. The users can charge their
batteries again in their homes during the off-peak times. In this manner, the users can gain
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some profits. Though, we have not explicitly considered this scenario, our model can be easily
extended to the above scenario. For example, the price pBUk,l,t < 0 where l ≤ 0 will denote that
the user k’s EV will be discharged at most l amount within deadline t and additional battery
utilization BU ≥ 0. The negative price indicates that the charging station will pay to the user,
as the user is delivering energy to the grid.
Note that the only constraint needs to be changed is to replace l with |l| in (12). Since PBUl,tdead
still remains a linear programming problem (Definition 2), the charging station can still find
vBUl,t − v−k and can select prices according to the strategies discussed before. Hence, our results
also holds in this scenario.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Parameters and Setup
We numerically study and compare various pricing strategies presented in this paper. We
evaluate the profit of the charging station and the user’s surplus achieved in those pricing
strategies. We also analyze the impact of the V2G service.
Similar to [22], the user’s utility for energy x is taken to be of the form−x
2 + 2rx if x ≤ r
r2 otherwise.
Thus, the user’s utility is a strictly increasing and concave function in the amount energy
consumed x. The quadratic utility functions for EV charging have also been considered in [23],
[24]. Note that the user’s desired level of charging is r. We assume that r is a random variable.
[25] shows that in a commercial charging station, the average amount of energy consumed per
EV is 6.9kWh with standard deviation 4.9kWh. We assume that r is a truncated Gaussian random
variable with mean 6.9kWh and standard deviation 4.9kWh, where the truncation is to the interval
[2, 20]. We assume that the maximum battery capacity is dmax = 25, and the minimum capacity
as dmin = 2. The initial battery level of a new user is assumed to be uniformly distributed in
the interval [2, 25 − r]. Note that the upper bound is 25 − r, since the user’s desired level of
charging is r.
Following [25], the deadline or the time spent by an electric vehicle in a commercial charging
is distributed with an exponential distribution with mean 2.5 hours. Thus, the preferred deadline
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(Tpref ) of the user to be an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 2.5. Users
strictly prefer a lower deadline for a given energy. We assume the utility as a convex decreasing
function of the deadline. The utility of the user after the preferred deadline is assumed to be 0.
Hence, the user’s utility for energy l and deadline t is chosen as the following
Uk,l,t = min{−l2 + 2rl, r2}×
(exp(Tpref − t− tk)− 1)+/(exp(Tpref − tk)− 1) (22)
The cost for the battery utilization is taken as Ck(BU) = αBU . We assume that α = 0.07.
Thus, the total utility for the user for contract (l, t, BU) is
UBUk,l,t = Uk,l,t − αBU. (23)
The arrival process of electric vehicles is assumed to be a non-homogeneous Poisson arrival
process since the arrival rates vary over time. For example, during the peak-hours (8 am to 5pm)
the arrival rate is higher compared to the off-peak hours. The arrival rates are chosen as 15 (5,
resp.) vehicles per hour during the peak period (off-peak period, resp.). We also assume that the
maximum charging rate Rmax is 3.3 kW. We also assume Rmin as −3.3 kW.
The energy harvesting device is assumed to harvest energy which is a truncated Gaussian
random variable with mean 2 and standard deviation 1 per hour. Initial battery level is assumed
to be 0 i.e. it is fully discharged. The prices ct for the conventional energy is assumed to be
governed by Time-of-Use (ToU) time scale. Thus, the cost of buying conventional energy varies
over time. We assume that the selling price, gt = ct − 0.001.
B. Results
We assume that the charging station is unaware of the exact utilities. However, it knows the
lower endpoints of the support sets. The charging station also knows the value of α and the
structure of the utility function, but does not know the realized values. We consider the pricing
strategy that we have introduced in Section V-B, which is given here
pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + max
i,j,b
{Lbk,i,j − vbi,j + v−k}+ + β.
Recall from Definition 4 that Lk,l,t is the lowest end-point of the utility Uk,l,t. We study the
impact of β. We also study the impact of the maximum storage capacity of the charging station
Bmax. Towards this end, we consider two different values of Bmax; a low value, Bmax = 5kWh,
and a high value, Bmax = 20kWh.
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1) Effect on Percentage of the users admitted: Fig. 3 shows that as β increases the number
of admitted users decreases. However, the decrement is slow initially. When β becomes larger
than a threshold, the price selected to the users becomes very large, and thus, fewer number of
EVs are admitted. Note that V2G service enables the charging station to admit more users.
2) Effect of β on User’s Surplus and Profit of the charging station: Fig. 4 shows that as β
increases, the user’s surplus decreases, as the users pay more. The decrement is not significant
for small values of β. Also, note that V2G enhances the user’s surplus even though the users
incur costs for the V2G service.
As β increases the profit increases initially. However, when β > 1.5, the number of users
served decreases rapidly, hence, the profit also drops. V2G service significantly increases the
profit of the charging station.
At high values of β both users’ surpluses and the profit decrease significantly. Low values of
β gives high users’ surpluses, however, the profit is low. β ∈ [0.5, 1.5] is the best candidate for
the balance between profit and users’ surpluses.
3) Effect of Lower Bmax: Fig. 5 shows that if the charging station’s storage capacity is low,
the user’s surplus and the profit decrease. This is because when the storage capacity is low, the
charging station can only store lower amount of energy for the future use. Hence, the charging
station has to pay more to buy conventional energy during the peak period. Hence, the charging
station’s profit and the user’s surplus both decrease.
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4) Effect on the average deadline: We subsequently study the effect of β on the time spent
by the users in the charging station (Fig. 6). Our analysis shows that users spend more time in
the charging station with the increase in β. As β increases, the users which have preferences for
lower deadlines have to pay more, since the cost of fulfilling lower deadline contracts is high.
Hence, those users are reluctant to accept the contract. Thus, the accepted users spend more
time in the charging station.
Fig. 6 also shows that the EVs spend lower amount of time when Bmax is high. This is
because when Bmax is high, the charging station’s cost to fulfill contracts with a lower deadline
is lower compared to low Bmax.
5) Average amount of V2G energy: Fig. 7 shows the average amount of battery utilization
of each EV as a function of β. As β increases the average battery utilization increases. When
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β is high, the user has to pay a larger amount. However, if the user agrees for higher battery
utilization, then the price may be low because the charging station may incur a lower cost.
Hence, the average battery utilization increases as β becomes high. Since the charging station
can only store a lower amount of renewable energy and a lower amount of energy bought from
the grid during the off-peak periods, hence, the average battery utilization is higher for lower
Bmax. The batteries of EVs are used more for lower storage capacity.
6) Effect on the maximum number of active users: Fig. 8 shows the impact of β on the
maximum number of EVs that can simultaneously charge (or, the number of active users) along
time. This given an idea of how much charging spots we need, in order to implement the pricing
strategy. Since the average time spent by users in the charging station increases with β and the
number of admitted users are almost the same for β ≤ 1, the number of active users increases
as β increases. Since when Bmax is low the average time spent by an EV increases, thus, the
number of active users is higher when Bmax is low.
7) Energy bought from the Grid: Fig. 9 shows the energy bought from the grid over the day.
The figure shows that the peak is significantly reduced during the on-peak period. In fact, the
peak is shifted to the off-peak period even though more users come during the on peak period.
This is because during the on-peak periods, the EVs are mainly used for discharging or the
charging station uses more energy from its storage. During the off-peak period, the EVs are
charged, and energy is stored in the battery of the charging station.
8) Impact of Bmax on the peak energy used from Grid: Fig. 10 shows that the peak energy
used from the grid is higher when Bmax is high. This is because when Bmax is high, more energy
is bought and stored during the off-peak period which results in a higher peak. The reduction
of the peak decreases very slowly with β initially. However, as β becomes very high, very few
users are admitted which results in the drop of peak energy.
9) Effect on the average energy: As β increases the users with higher utilities will accept
the contracts. Thus, users with higher energy demand will be more likely to accept the contract
and hence, the average charging amount for each EV should increase with β. However, Fig. 11
shows that for β ≤ 1, the average energy consumed by each EV does not increase significantly
with the increase in β. The apparent anomaly is due to the fact that the users with higher demand
but with smaller deadline preferences, may have to pay more because of the increase in the price
to fulfill the contract as β increases. Hence, such users will not accept the offers which results
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in a decrease of the average energy consumption with the increase in β initially . However,
as β increases only the users with higher demand accept offers increasing the average energy
consumption. Since the user spends more time for lower Bmax, the average energy consumed
by each EV is slightly higher for low Bmax.
10) Effect on the price selected by the charging station: Fig. 12 shows that as β increases
the price increases. Interestingly, price is not higher during the peak-period, since more EVs are
involved in the V2G service during the peak period. During the off-peak period, the price from
the conventional energy is low which does not provide any incentive for the V2G service. A
new price is selected every-time an EV is admitted. However, our study shows that the variation
of prices within a time interval is nominal.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a menu-based pricing approach for V2G service where the charging
station selects prices to the arriving users for different charging amounts, additional amount of
battery utilization, and the deadline. The user either selects one of the contracts or rejects all
based on her utility function. When the charging station is aware of the utilities, there exists
a profit maximizing pricing strategy which can also maximize the social welfare, however, it
provides zero user’s surplus. However, when the charging station is not aware of the utilities
there is no profit maximizer pricing strategy which can maximize the ex-post social welfare.
This paper also considered a pricing strategy which gives a fixed positive profit to the charging
station irrespective of the contract chosen. The conditions where the users have incentives to
participate in the V2G service are characterized, and it is seen that the V2G service is more
preferable when the harvested energy is low, and the storage capacity of the charging station is
low.
This work can be extended in several directions. For example, the characterization of the
optimal price in the non-myopic setting remain open. This paper considered a fixed price for
selling the energy to the grid. The optimal price that the grid should set to enhance the V2G
service or reduce the peak consumption constitutes a future research direction.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show that etst = 0 in any optimal solution of (14). Subsequently, we show that
r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 for every i ∈ K0 ∪ {k} and t.
Suppose that in an optimal solution we have et > 0 and st > 0 for some t. We show that this
can not be an optimal solution.
Consider the following
s∗t = max{stηc,cs − et/ηd,cs, 0},
e∗t = max{et/ηd,cs − stηc,cs, 0}. (24)
The constraint in (8) is satisfied with e∗t , s
∗
t in place of et and st respectively.
Now, since ηd,cs < 1, and ηc,cs < 1, thus, e∗t > et. Thus, e
∗
t − s∗t > et − st. Hence,
x∗t − q∗t = e∗t − rt,charge + rt,discharge − s∗t
> et − st − rt,charge + rt,discharge
= xt − qt (25)
The other constraints are independent of et, st, hence, it will be feasible. Thus, with the modified
x∗t , q
∗
t , e
∗
t , and s
∗
t , with the other unchanged solution the value of the optimization problem is
lower. Hence, this leads to a contradiction.
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Now, we show that r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 in an optimal solution of (14). Suppose that in an optimal
solution we have r+i,t > 0 and r
−
i,t > 0 for some i ∈ K0∪{k} and t. Now, consider the following
modification for each i ∈ K0 ∪ {k}.
r+,∗i,t = max{r+i,t − r−i,t, 0}
r−,∗i,t = max{r−i,t − r+i,t, 0}. (26)
Note that because of the above modification
r+,∗i,t − r−,∗i,t = r+i,t − r−i,t = ri,t. (27)
Hence, the constraints in (1), (4), (5), (6), (12) are satisfied for this modified solution.
Now, consider the following
r∗t,charge = r
+,∗
k,t /ηk,c +
∑
i∈K0
r+,∗i,t /ηi,c,
r∗t,discharge = ηk,dcr
−,∗
k,t +
∑
i∈K0
ηi,dcr
−,∗
i,t . (28)
Since ηi,c < 1 , and ηi,dc < 1 for all i ∈ K0 ∪ {k} and r+i,tr−i,t > 0 for at least index i, thus,
r∗t,charge − r∗t,discharge < rt,charge − rt,discharge. Thus, if x∗t and q∗t are modified as follows
x∗t − q∗t = et − r∗t,charge + r∗t,discharge − st
> et − st − rt,charge + rt,discharge
= xt − qt (29)
then the constraints in (8), (7) are also satisfied when the rest of the solution are unchanged.
However, the cost decreases as x∗t − q∗t > xt − qt with the modified values of r+,∗i,t , r−,∗i,t , ∀i ∈
K0 ∪ {k}, r∗t,charge, r∗t,discharge, x∗t , q∗t . This contradicts that r+i,t, r−i,t are optimal. Hence, the result
follows.
The above theorem also shows the transformation of the optimal solution requires to get
etst = 0 (cf.(24), (25)) and r+i,tr
−
i,t = 0 (cf.(26), (28), (29)) in case if xt − qt are bounded. The
modified solution will still be bounded.
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B. Proof of Theorem 6
Suppose the statement is false. Without loss of generality, assume that pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t −v−k+ζBUl,t
where ζBUl,t 6= ζ for some BU , l and t achieves a strictly higher expected payoff than the pricing
strategy pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + ζ .
The expected profit of the charging station for pricing strategy pBUk,l,t = v
BU
l,t − v−k + ζBUl,t is
given by
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
BUmax∑
BU=0
(pBUk,l,t − vBUl,t + v−k) Pr(RBUk,l,t)− v−k
=
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
BUmax∑
BU=0
ζBUl,t Pr(R
BU
l,t )− v−k (30)
Now, we evaluate the expression Pr(RBUl,t ). The user k will select the menu p
BU
k,l,t with a positive
probability if Y BUk,l,t +Xk ≥ vBUl,t − v−k + ζBUl,t and for every (i, j, b) 6= (l, t, BU),
ζBUl,t − ζbi,j ≤ Y BUk,l,t − vBUl,t − Y bk,i,j + vbi,j (31)
Since Y BUk,l,t , Y
b
k,i,j, v
BU
l,t , v
b
i,j are fixed, hence, the above inequality is either satisfied or not satisfied
with probability 1. More specifically, the user selects the menu (l, t, BU) if Y BUk,l,t + Xk ≥
vBUl,t − v−k + ζBUl,t and
Y BUk,l,t − vBUl,t − ζBUl,t ≥ max
i,j,b
(Y bk,i,j − vbi,j − ζbi,j) (32)
Without loss of generality, assume that ζb1l1,t1 be the maximum value for which the above inequality
is satisfied i.e.
ζb1l1,t1 = max{αBUl,t : Y BUk,l,t − vBUl,t − ζBUl,t ≥ maxi,j,b (Y
b
k,i,j − vbi,j − ζbi,j)} (33)
The random variable Xk only affects the probability whether Y b1k,l1,t1 +Xk ≥ vb1l1,t1 − v−k + ζb1l1,t1
or not. Hence, the charging station’s expected profit is upper bounded by
ζb1l1,t1 Pr(Xk ≥ vb1l1,t1 − v−k + ζb1l1,t1 − Y b1k,l1,t1) (34)
Note that by the definition of ζ (Definition 6),
ζ max
l,t,b
Pr(Y bk,l,t +Xk ≥ vbl,t − v−k + ζ)
≥ ζb1l1,t1 Pr(Xk ≥ vl1,t1 − v−k + ζb1l1,t1 − Y b1k,l1,t1) (35)
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However by Theorem 5 the expected payoff of the charging station when it selects the price
vBUl,t − v−k + ζ is given by the expression in the left-hand side of the inequality in (35). Hence,
this leads to a contradiction. Thus, the result follows.
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